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Abstract—To date, location privacy protection is a critical issue
in Location-Based Services (LBS). In this work, we propose a
novel geometric framework based on the classical discrete geo-
metric structure, the Voronoi-Delaunay duality (VDD). We utilize
the fact that the user location cannot be recovered if only given
an irregular n-sided Voronoi cell around it, and the anonymity
zone is the intersection of all the parallel strips perpendicular
to and bounded by n Voronoi edges. The irregular Voronoi cell
and its variations can be used as the concealing space to hide
the user location or the region of interest and submitted to the
LBS server. Within this framework, we propose multiple typical
anonymizing models by introducing irregularity to the convex
regular VDD structure by shifting the interior Voronoi cell,
exterior Delaunay polygon, sector rays, or their combinations.
The proposed methods are efficient by taking advantage of the
VDD principle where main computations are linear line-line
intersections. Experiments with various parameters demonstrate
the efficiency and efficacy of the proposed n-VDD framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the help of pervasive global positioning system (GPS)
and radio frequency identification (RFID) enabled mobile
computing, the market share of location-based services (LBS)
is increasing rapidly [6]. Today, people frequently use LBS
to find the nearest ATM, restaurant, hospital, or gas sta-
tion. Social networks, including but not limited to Facebook,
LinkedIn and Twitter, as well as Internet telephony service
providers such as Skype have all created frameworks for
geosocial networking. LBS providers require users to divulge
their exact location but guarantee a higher quality of service
(QoS) with more accurate location data. If one uses Yelp to
look for restaurants in a 15 mile radius, it would not matter
if the location data is not as accurate, with the search being
conducted in a relatively large area. Conversely, if a user looks
to find the nearest gas station, Google Map would require a
more accurate location to ensure a higher QoS. A user may
enjoy receiving services with higher precisions, but is unaware
of the possible exploitations of his/her location data. LBS
providers can use this data to understand a user’s mobility
pattern, enabling them to send unwanted advertisements; and
attackers can perform malicious attacks. This has led to a
general consensus that protecting a user’s location privacy is
a highly important issue in LBS.
Previous studies have designed location privacy models
based on a trade-off between location privacy and QoS. If the
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degree of privacy is high, then the QoS is low and vice versa.
So, it is important to understand this trade-off while designing
a LBS privacy model. We classify the previous methods to
protect location privacy into three main categories [36]: 1) k-
anonymity, 2) position dummies, and 3) spatial obfuscation.
In k-anonymity, the framework pairs a user’s location with
k-1 locations of other neighboring users [16], [13], [40], [22],
[15], [33], [28] [12], [23], [10] and provides the LBS provider
with a box containing that user and the other k− 1 locations.
This approach engenders several problems. It has an inherent
dependency on the presence of the other k − 1 users in
the specified region or time. Furthermore, each user cannot
have a personalized privacy setting with the settings of the
other neighboring users overlapping. Gedik et al. proposed the
CliqueCloak theorem [14] to improve the original k-anonymity
approach that joins multiple queries that overlap together into
a clique, and sends the minimum bounding rectangle of those
users as a single query. Although it is advantageous in the
case of reducing computation time and increasing the privacy
of the users, it can fail to join users into a clique. Marius et
al. [36] classified several improved methods of k-anonymity:
strong k-anonymity [39], [34], l-diversity [4], t-closeness [25],
p-sensitivity[31], and historical k-anonymity [29], [37], [1],
[26]. In these schemes, the probability of identifying a user is
1/k. These approaches also suffer from a high communication
and query processing cost [11].
The position dummy based techniques direct multiple fake
positions along with user’s true location to location service
providers [9], [27], [32], [21], [35], [20]. Hua et al. [27]
proposed a dummy-based method, titled PAD, which generates
dummy users in a virtual grid or circle. Qilang et al. [32]
proposed a user dummy generation based clustering method
to provide privacy on road networks. Location obfuscation
methods have the advantage of generating dummy locations
by itself, unlike the k-anonymity based methods. However,
generating indistinguishable dummy locations is a challenge
for these methods [36].
To address the problems of k-anonymity and dummy based
methods, some solutions propose spatial obfuscation methods
[2], [18], [24], [38], [19], [30], [7], [3], [5], based on the idea
of providing a user-defined obfuscation area without revealing
explicit location information at the expense of quality of ser-
vices. Ardagna et al. [2] proposed a method to submit a circle
instead of a user’s exact location. Different methods were
presented to use other geometric transformations to preserve a
user’s location. Kalnis et al. [] proposed transformations based
on the k-anonymity concept for nearest neighbor search, while
hiding user’s location. Gutscher et al. [18] detailed the use of
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2Table I: Table of Symbols
Symbol Definition
O User’s location (or seed)
n Number of vertices of polygon around O
Pc (P′c/P∗c) Delaunay polygon (shifted/scaled)
Ci (C′i/C
∗
i ) Delaunay polygon vertices (shifted/scaled)
Pv (P′v/P∗v) Voronoi polygon (shifted/scaled)
Vi (V ′i /V
∗
i ) Voronoi polygon vertices (shifted/scaled)
Az (A′z/A∗z) Anonymity zone (shifted/scaled)
Ai (A∗i ) Anonymity zone vertices (scaled)
α 2pi
n
, sector angle
|OX| Length of line segment OX
τ Range of vertices on a line
κ Range of random angle adaption
r User-defined radius of interest
λ Scaling factor
Ψ Concealing cost
Γ Privacy level
coordinate transformation to protect a user’s privacy. Min et
al. [38] proposed a privacy scheme based on a line-symmetric
transformation for database privacy in cloud computing. Li
et al. [24] proposed a geometric approach towards location
privacy that divides the user’s region of interest (ROI) into n
concealing disks (n-CD) and submits the centers and the radii
of those concealing disks for transmission. Guo et al. [17]
extended n-CD by introducing dynamic pseudonyms-changing
mechanism with the expense of concealing and communica-
tion costs. The proposed framework in this work falls into this
category, and is comparable to the n-CD approach.
A. Our Approach
In this work, we propose a novel framework based on the
classical geometric structure, the so-called Voronoi-Delaunay
Duality (VDD). Table I gives the symbols used in the work.
As shown in Fig. 1, we treat the user location O as the center
and properly select n discrete points C = {C0, C1, ..., Cn−1}
(n ≥ 3) on the Euclidean plane surrounding O to result
a Delaunay triangulation T, by connecting edges CiO and
CiCi+1 (Cn = C0). Each triangle M CiOCi+1 satisfies empty
circle criterion, i.e., the circumcircle of the triangle doesn’t
contain any other point. The Voronoi diagram of C ∪ {O} is
computed by the perpendicular bisector lines of all the edges
of T and their intersection points V = {V0, V1, ..., Vn−1}.
The Voronoi diagram and the Delaunay triangulation T are
dual to each other. The dual relationship is unique. The VDD
gives a two-layered dual structure defined around the user
location O, including the exterior convex Delaunay polygon
Pc = 〈C0C1...Cn−1〉 and the interior convex Voronoi polygon
Pv = 〈V0V1...Vn−1〉, as shown in Fig. 1(a). The facts include:
1) Pc and O define the interior Pv uniquely;
2) Pv and O define Pc uniquely; and
3) Pc and Pv define O uniquely.
However, if only Pv and without any other information, one
cannot figure out the exact location of the center O. But it can
give the feasible region containing the user location. Based
on the VDD perpendicular rule, we draw the parallel strip
perpendicular to each edge of Voronoi cell, the intersecting
region of all the parallel strips and the Voronoi cell is a convex
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(a) Anonymity zone (b) Examples when n = 3, 4
from Voronoi polygon with corner angles ≤ pi/2
Figure 1: Voronoi-Delaunay duality and anonymity zone.
polygon Az = 〈A0A1...Am〉, where any point may be the user
location. This region is the so-called anonymity zone in our
framework. Figure 1(a) shows one example when n = 5 where
the anonymity zone Az is within the Voronoi cell, and (b) gives
two examples when n = 3, 4, where the anonymity zone is
the Voronoi polygon itself. It means that at a Voronoi polygon
vertex with corner angle ≤ pi/2, the associated perpendicular
lines are either outside the Voronoi cell or overlap the Voronoi
edges, and then the associated Voronoi polygon edges are used
for computing the intersection. Therefore, the interior Voronoi
polygon Pv can be used to hide the user location O. In the
n-VDD framework, we submit the Voronoi polygon or its
variations to the LBS provider.
T
Pc
Pv
Az
O
Figure 2: VDD of convex regular polygons.
The unique degenerated case is that if Pc is a convex regular
polygon1 taking O as the centroid, then the Pv is regular with
the same centroid, as shown in Fig. 2. In this case, if there
is such a principle in the protocol public to users/attackers:
Pc is regular around O, then O can be easily recovered from
Pv, i.e., the centroid of Pv. To conquer this, our strategy
is to introduce irregularity to the VDD structure of a convex
regular polygon, in detail, by shifting the exterior polygon Pc,
or interior polygon Pv, or both, to be irregular. The following
three models are given to demonstrate the performance of the
n-VDD framework.
Model I - Interior Shifting. Pc is a regular n-sided convex
polygon with the centroid at O. We adapt the correspond-
ing Voronoi cell Pv to be irregular by parallelly shifting
each Voronoi edge along the dual Delaunay edge while
keeping all the Voronoi cell vertices within each original
sector and Pc. The shifting position is uniformly and
randomly selected within a range calculated based on the
1In Euclidean geometry, a regular polygon is a polygon that is equiangular
and equilateral.
3above condition, which guarantees the user location O is
included in the shifted Voronoi cell.
Model II - Exterior Shifting. We shift Pc to be an irregular
n-sided convex polygon around O such that the corre-
sponding triangulation T is still Delaunay. The resulted
Voronoi cell Pv is also irregular. For each Delaunay
vertex Ci+1, we compute the valid range on its sector
ray such that the Voronoi vertex Vi is within the corre-
sponding sector ^CiOCi+1, and then we randomly and
uniformly select a point in the valid range as Ci+1.
Model III - Double Shifting. We first shift Pc to be an ir-
regular n-sided convex polygon around O as Model II, to
guarantee the corresponding triangulation T is Delaunay,
and then we shift the resulted Voronoi cell Pv as Model
I. This is a combination of Models I, II. Generally, both
the exterior and interior polygons are irregular.
Sector Shifting: Another aspect to generate irregularity from
the convex polygon is to shift the sector rays to make the sector
angles not equal. We integrate the sector shifting operation into
the above three Models I, II and III, to generate three variation
Models Iα, IIα and IIIα accordingly. In each anonymizing
model, we first randomly and uniformly perturb the sector
rays in a range to achieve the sector angle inequality, and then
apply other anonymizing principles. Note that the randomness
of sector rays itself on a convex regular polygon can generate
an irregular convex polygon with the same sector radius.
The resulted Voronoi cell is irregular. We call this Model α.
However, it can not be used for anonymization. That is because
the center O can be easily calculated by the intersection of
the bisectors of two Voronoi edges due to the property of
the same sector radius, as shown in Fig. 3 with a simulation
example. Therefore, only angle randomness on the convex
regular polygon is not enough for hiding the user location.
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O
Figure 3: Illustration of the VDD model with only angle
randomness α on a convex regular polygon, which reveals
the center O and can not be used for anonymization.
In summary, there are three irregularity principles to adapt
the convex regular polygon to achieve irregular VDD struc-
tures, (1) interior shifting, (2) exterior shifting and (3) sector
shifting. The combinations of the three can form totally 7
models (see Table II), among which the Model α is not
applicable for anonymization, and other 6 Models I, II, III,
Iα, IIα, and IIIα are to be used for anonymization (see Figs.
4, 5 and 6). Details will be explained in later sections.
In this framework, the scaled Voronoi cell P∗v of the shifted
Voronoi cell P′v will be used as the concealing space Ωcs of
the user, which hides the user location and is submitted to the
LBS providers. The area of the anonymity zone A∗z resulted
from the concealing space P∗v, is defined as the privacy level.
Thus, bigger concealing space generates bigger anonymity
zone and higher privacy level for the user location privacy.
When the user submits a query of places of interest within a
circular range r, the query area is τ0 = pir2. We compute the
closest distance d0 to the edges of the originally generated P′v
and define the scalar λv = rd0 , and then transform the Voronoi
polygon P′v by a scaling operation with scalar λv and the user
location O as the origin. The transformed Voronoi polygon,
i.e., the final concealing space, is denoted as P∗v = λvP
′
v,
which covers the query region with radius r, as shown in Fig.
7. Users also have flexibility to customize the privacy level in
the system by setting the expected anonymity range ι. Then,
similarly, we compute a scalar λz = ιd0 , and transform the
Voronoi polygon to be P∗v = λzP
′
v by a λz-scaling around
O. If the user customizes both privacy level and concealing
space, we use compute P∗v = max(λv, λz)P
′
v.
All the computations are constructive by using planar ge-
ometry and linear algebra, and therefore are efficient.
B. Contributions
In this work, we present a novel location privacy frame-
work, named n-VDD, based on the unique discrete geometric
structure Voronoi-Delaunay Duality (VDD). In detail,
• Six models are proposed, to introduce irregularity to
convex regular VDD structure.
• The concealing space is derived from the Voronoi poly-
gon. The privacy level can be customized.
• The method is efficient by utilizing the planar VDD,
where computations are linear line-line intersections.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes the system model, Section III presents the algorithms
of the n-VDD models, Section IV details the application
settings, experiments and discussions, and finally Section V
concludes the paper.
II. n-VDD LOCATION PRIVACY PROTECTION MODEL
In this section, we first review the background knowledge of
VDD, and then describe the VDD-based system for location
privacy protection and the anonymizing protocol, and finally
perform the attack analysis.
A. Background
1) Voronoi-Delaunay Duality (VDD): Voronoi diagram and
Delaunay triangulation are the classical geometric structures in
computational geometry [8]. The Voronoi diagram of a point
set C of n points in the plane is a subdivision of the plane into
n Voronoi cells, such that each Voronoi cell around Ci ∈ C
is the set of all points from which Ci is the closest among
all other points in C. The dual of the Voronoi diagram is
a unique triangulation, known as the Delaunay triangulation.
A triangulation is Delaunay means that it satisfies the empty
circumcircle criterion, i.e., for any triangle, its circumcircle
4Table II: The n-VDD models. IR - Irregularity. Model α is not applicable for anonymization.
Model IR.1 Interior Sifting IR.2 Exterior Shifting IR.3 Sector Shifting Anonymizing Protocol Generated Polygons
I
√
- - S0 → R1 → P1 → R0 Pc → Pv → P′v → P∗v
II -
√
- S0 → P2 → R1 → R0 Pc → P′c → P′v → P∗v
III
√ √
- S0 → P2 → R1 → P1 → R0 Pc → P′c → P′v → P′v → P∗v
α - -
√
N/A N/A
Iα
√
-
√
S1 → R1 → P1 → R0 P′c → P′v → P′v → P∗v
IIα -
√ √
S1 → P2 → R1 → R0 P′c → P′c → P′v → P∗v
IIIα
√ √ √
S1 → P2 → R1 → P1 → R0 P′c → P′c → P′v → P′v → P∗v
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Figure 4: Simulation examples of the n-VDD models I and Iα before scaling by ROI radius.
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Figure 5: Simulation examples of the n-VDD models II and IIα before scaling by ROI radius.
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Figure 6: Simulation examples of the n-VDD models III and IIIα before scaling by ROI radius.
doesn’t contain any other point, such triangle is called Delau-
nay triangle. The optimal time complexity for constructing
Voronoi diagram and Delaunay triangulation is O(n log n),
and the dual conversion between them costs O(n).
2) Local Structures: In our model, we require a proper
exterior polygon such that the triangulation T obtained by
connecting each vertex of the polygon to the user location
O is Delaunay. Once the exterior polygon is fixed, the VDD
structure is determined. Based on the VDD property, three
convex polygons surrounding O are generated, as follows:
• Delaunay Polygon Pc = 〈C0C1...Cn−1〉, the convex
boundary polygon of the Delaunay triangulation T.
• Voronoi Polygon Pv = 〈V0V1...Vn−1〉, the convex poly-
gon generated by applying the VDD principle on T.
• Anonymity Zone Az = 〈A0A1...An−1〉, the convex poly-
gon generated by the intersection of the perpendicular
strips for the edges of Voronoi polygon.
We start from the Voronoi-Delaunay structure of the convex
regular n-sided polygon using O as the center, and make
variations to the structure to introduce irregularity. We adapt
the exterior Delaunay polygon or/and interior Voronoi polygon
to be irregular, which guarantees that the anonymity zone is a
5−1 0 1 2
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Figure 7: Illustration of the VDD model I after scaling based
on the ROI radius r = 1.0.
convex region, not a single point. Different variations induce
different anonymizing protocols. The n-VDD framework may
have other variations by introducing different irregularities.
B. System Model
In a typical LBS system, a user generates a query q0 which
is a tuple of his/her identification, the location O = (x, y),
the radius of the neighborhood r, and the points of interests
(POI) I , such as the gas stations, ATMs and so on. That is,
q0 = 〈uid, 〈(x, y), r〉, I〉. This query is transmitted to a local
anonymizer engine which generates the concealing space (i.e.,
adapted Vononoi polygon), and based on the query framework,
the concealing space is transmitted to LBS system.
• Model I: exterior polygon Pc is convex regular; interior
Voronoi polygon is shifted to be irregular. The interior
polygon generated by shifting is denoted as
P′v = 〈V ′0V ′1 ...V ′n−1〉. (1)
• Model II: exterior convex regular polygon Pc is shifted
to be irregular. The exterior polygon generated by shifting
is denoted as
P′c = 〈C ′0C ′1...C ′n−1〉. (2)
The interior Voronoi polygon P′v of P
′
c is irregular.
• Model III: exterior polygon is shifted to be irregular P′c;
the interior Voronoi polygon of P′c is shifted to P
′
v.
Suppose the area of the finally resulted interior polygon
P′v in each model is denoted as τv . According to the closest
distance d0 to the edges of the originally generated Pv, we
compute a scaling transformation of the P′v with scalar λv =
r
d0
(O as the origin), denoted as P∗v = λvP
′
v. P
∗
v is the final
concealing space,
P∗v = 〈V ∗0 V ∗1 . . . V ∗n−1〉. (3)
Then the original query q0 becomes qv = 〈uid,P∗v, I〉.
The user may also set privacy level ρ0, defined by the
expected the anonymity radius parameter ι, ρ0 = piι2. In
this case, the original query q0 = 〈uid, 〈(x, y), r, ι〉, I〉.
Similarly, we compute a scalar λz = ιd0 . Then we have
P∗v = max(λv, λz)P
′
v. If the user only cares about the
customized privacy level, then P∗v = λzP
′
v.
C. Anonymizing Protocol
The anonymizing protocols are generally public to audience.
The followings are the common principles for all models:
• R0 - Scaling: The submitted concealing space denoted as
P∗v is obtained by a λ-scaling of a convex polygon P
′
v
around the user location. The λ is computed based on the
user’s requirements on privacy level and range of interest.
• R1 - Voronoi-Delaunay Duality: The convex polygon P′v
has a dual convex polygon P′c: 1) each edge has a
perpendicular dual edge; 2) all the dual edges intersect
at the user location; and 3) all other endpoints of the
dual edges are outside P′v and form P
′
c, P
′
c ⊃ P′v. For
each edge of P′v, a feasible strip is computed, which
is perpendicular to the edge and exactly bounds it. The
intersection of the feasible strips of all the edges is a
convex feasible region, denoted as Az. Similarly, the
final anonymity zone A∗z can be computed from P
∗
v. A
∗
z
differs from Az by a scalar λ, which is λz or λv .
The exterior polygon Pc can be convex regular (equiangular
and equilateral) or irregular with different sector angles, then
there are the following alternative principles:
• S0 - Sector Uniformization: The polygon Pc is convex
and regular taking the user location O as the centroid, and
forms a Delaunay triangulation by connecting each vertex
of Pc to O, which defines sector rays. Then, the resulted
dual Voronoi polygon Pv around O is constructed by the
perpendicular bisector intersections, and is regular.
• S1 - Sector Shifting: The sector rays of the original
exterior polygon Pc are randomly shifted in a range to
generate a new exterior polygon P′c, such that each vertex
of the resulted dual Voronoi polygon P′v is shifted within
its corresponding sector.
Besides the above, each model has its own principle:
• P1 - Interior Shifting: The exterior polygon Pc and O
form a Delaunay triangulation by sector rays. The interior
polygon P′v is generated by randomly shifting each edge
of the Voronoi cell Pv of Pc in parallel, such that each
vertex of P′v is shifted within its original sector.
• P2 - Exterior Shifting: The exterior polygon P′c is gener-
ated by shifting each vertex of the original polygon Pc
along its sector ray, such that each vertex of the resulted
Voronoi polygon P′v is shifted within its original sector.
• P3 - Double Shifting (P1,P2 ): The exterior polygon P′c is
generated by shifting the vertices of the original Pc along
sector rays, and the resulted Voronoi edges are shifted in
parallel to form the interior polygon P′v, such that each
vertex of P′v is shifted within its original sector. It is the
combination of P1 and P2.
Table II gives the anonymizing pipeline in each model.
D. Attack Analysis
We analyze the ability of the VDD models to protect the
user location O from the attacker. Suppose the query message
qv is obtained by the attacker. Then the attacker has:
• An n-sided convex irregular polygon P∗v, which is a
scaled (shifted) Voronoi polygon hiding the user location;
• An anonymizing protocol, one of Table II.
61) Protocol Attack: Attacking can be tried by reversing
the anonymizing process and analyzing each principle. The
common principles are analyzed as follows:
• R0−1 - Scaling: The scaling uses the user location as
the origin, which guarantees the user location is always
within P∗v, and the shape of P
∗
v is similar to that of the
resulted interior polygon P′v in all the models.
• R1−1 - Voronoi-Delaunay Duality: For each edge of P∗v,
we can find a feasible strip which is perpendicular to the
edge and exactly bounds the edge. The intersection of all
the feasible strips forms the anonymity zone A∗z. For any
point o ∈ A∗z, we find the point C∗i for edge V ∗i−1V ∗i
of P∗v such that V
∗
i−1V
∗
i is the perpendicular bisector of
oC∗i . All the C
∗
i ’s form the exterior Delaunay polygon
P∗c (see Fig. 1). The Delaunay edges C
∗
i−1C
∗
i exist and
are uniquely determined. Therefore, every point in the
anonymity zone has a VDD structure satisfying principle
R1, and could be the user location O.
Principles specific to each model are analyzed as follows:
• S0−1 - Sector Uniformization: From S0, the surrounding
angles around the user location are identical to be 2pin ,
where n is the number of vertices of P∗v (convex). For
any point o ∈ A∗z, we draw the perpendicular lines to
all the edges of P∗v and the angles surrounding o won’t
change when we shift the point within A∗z.
• (S0, P1)−1 - Interior Shifting: From P1, irregular P∗v is
obtained by shifting the regular Voronoi polygon, which
takes the user location as the centroid/center. Given any
point o ∈ A∗z, by shifting back the edges of P∗v, it is
guaranteed to generate a regular polygon to induce a
Delaunay polygon by R1. Therefore, every point in the
anonymity zone satisfies principles (S0, P1) (Model I).
• (S0, P2)−1 - Exterior Shifting: For any point o ∈ A∗z, the
Delaunay polygon P∗c resulted from the irregular P
∗
v is
unique and irregular (by R1 ). From S0, all surrounding
angles at o are equal. Then by shifting the edges of P∗c,
it is guaranteed to generate a regular polygon taking o
as the centroid. That means every point in the anonymity
zone satisfies principles (S0, P2) (Model II).
• (S0, P3)−1 - Double Shifting: For any point o ∈ A∗z, the
Delaunay polygon P∗c is uniquely computed (by R1 ). We
shift P∗v with a random range to P
′
v and then update
the Delaunay polygon to be P′c. By shifting P
′
c, it is
guaranteed to generate a regular polygon which takes o
as the centroid. That means every point in the anonymity
zone satisfies principles (S0, P3) (Model III).
• S1−1 - Sector Shifting: From S1, the surrounding angles
around the user location are unequal, and P∗v is irregular.
For any point o ∈ A∗z, we compute the Delaunay polygon
P∗c of P
∗
v by R1. The angles around o can be computed
and won’t change if shifting the point within A∗z.
• (S1, P1)−1 - Sector & Interior Shifting, (S1, P2)−1 -
Sector & Exterior Shifting, (S1, P3)−1 - Sector & Double
Shifting: For any point o ∈ A∗z, the Delaunay polygon
P∗c is uniquely computed (by R1 ). Shifting P
∗
v, P
∗
c, or
both won’t influence the surrounding angles, and also
won’t generate a regular polygon. Therefore, every point
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Figure 8: Distributions of centroids of Voronoi polygons (see
two examples in top row) and the plots of the average distance
from the seed O (bottom row).
in the anonymity zone satisfies corresponding principles
(Models Iα-IIIα).
Therefore, in all Models I-III, Iα-IIIα, every point in the
anonymity zone could be the user location, and the attackers
cannot differentiate the points in the anonymity zone.
2) Centroid Attack: Centroid is easy to compute for a given
polygon. Here, we need analyze whether the centroid can be
used for the attack.
First of all, all the anonymizing protocols introduce the
irregularity, so that the centroid of the submitted Voronoi poly-
gon P∗v (concealing space), denoted as CPv, is not guaranteed
to coincide with the user location. In Models I-III, P∗v is with
equal sector angles, and the centroid of interior/exterior regular
polygon in a VDD structure gives the user location, however,
the centroid of irregular P∗v is not the user location. In Models
Iα-IIIα, there is no guarantee that the centroid of irregular
P∗v is the user location. Therefore, direct concealing space
centroid attack can be avoided for each model. To verify this,
we generated 1000 irregular polygons by random shifting the
vertices along the sector rays (exterior vertex shifting), and
computed the centroids. Figure 8 gives two examples of the
distribution of the centroids around the user location O (top),
and also plots the average distance from O for n = 3..10. It is
observed that the centroid CPv is away from the user location
O in general case.
After generating the anonymity zone A∗z from P
∗
v, is it
possible to use the centroid of A∗z, denoted as CAz , to reveal
the user location? Similarly, CAz ∈ A∗z, CAz is not guaranteed
to coincide with the user location. Similar experiments verified
that. Then, will the two centroids, CPv and CAz , give a hint
to shrink the range? First, CPv can be inside or outside CPv,
there is no fixed relationship between their positions, as shown
in Fig. 9 (top). We then create a circle passing through the two
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Figure 9: The percentage (%) of times the seed O falls in the
circle of using the centroids of concealing space (red ‘+’) and
anonymity zone (blue ‘+’) as the diameter (see top row).
centroids and using the segment between them as the diameter,
and detect whether the circle includes the user location O.
Figure 9 (bottom) shows that the only a low portion (less than
23%) of the 1000 examples in the cases of n = 5..10 has the
user location in the circle of the two centroids. That means
the circle cannot be used to replace or shrink A∗z.
III. COMPUTATIONAL ALGORITHMS
This section details the computation of the anonymizing
process and the anonymity zone for the proposed models. They
share the same algorithms for the common anonymizing prin-
ciples R0 (scaling) , R1 (VDD), and have different algorithms
for their specific principles.
A. Common Algorithms
1) Voronoi Polygon: The Voronoi polygon Pv is generated
from the Delaunay triangulation T formed by the Delaunay
polygon Pc and the seed O (user location). Each vertex Vi of
Pv is the intersection of perpendicular bisector lines of line
segments OCi and OCi+1 (OCn = OC0) (see Fig. 1).
2) Anonymity Zone: From a given Voronoi polygon Pv,
the anonymity zone (feasible Region) Az is generated by
computing the intersecting region of the parallel strips, which
are perpendicular to and bounded by the Voronoi edge ViVi+1.
Any point in Az could be a feasible solution to the seed
O. In detail, assume Li, Li+1 are the perpendicular lines
at Vi, Vi+1, respectively, and the parallel strip is denoted as
Γi+1 = Li ∧ Li+1. Then Az = ∩{Γi},∀i = 0, . . . , n− 1.
3) Scaling: After getting the interior (shifted) Voronoi
polygon P′v and its anonymity zone A
′
z, we perform a scaling
transformation using the user location O as the origin with
a scaling factor λ. λ can be computed in different ways
according to the user query about the ROI radius or the
privacy level or both, as reported in Section II-B. Therefore,
the obtained concealing space P∗v = λP
′
v.
Algorithm 1 Model I - Interior Shifting
Input: User location O, vertex number n, radius of interest r
Output: The concealing space P∗v
Compute a regular n-sided polygon Pc = 〈C0C1 . . . Cn−1〉, such
that the centroid ΣCi
n
= O
Construct the triangulation T by connecting each Ci to O
Compute the Voronoi cell Pv = 〈V0V1 . . . Vn−1〉 of T
e′0 ← V0V1
for i← 1 to n− 1 do
Compute the feasible shifting range τi for ei+1 = ViVi+1
Shift ei+1 in parallel to Rand(τi) and get edge e′i+1
V ′i ← e′i+1 ∩ e′i
end for
Compute the feasible region of P′v = 〈V ′0V ′1 . . . V ′n−1〉
Compute the closest distance to the edges e′i and compute the
scaling by scalar λ = r
d0
Return P∗v ← λP′v
B. Model I - Interior Shifting
Model I introduces the irregularity to the interior Voronoi
polygon by shifting the Voronoi edges in their corresponding
feasible ranges to guarantee the Voronoi vertices are still in
their original sectors (to grantee O ∈ A′z).
Algorithm 1 shows the computation pipeline. We first gen-
erate a regular polygon using the user location as the centroid
and compute the Voronoi polygon based on Voronoi-Delaunay
duality, then shift the Voronoi edges to generate an irregular
Voronoi polygon, and finally scale the shifted Voronoi polygon
and submit the result to LBS providers.
In detail, after getting the regular Voronoi polygon, we fix
the first Voronoi edge e′0 = e0, and shift the left Voronoi edges
ei = ViVi+1 to the new one e′i one by one. For each Voronoi
edge ei, the shift range is determined by the previous Voronoi
edge e′i−1. For the last Voronoi edge en−1, the shift range is
determined by both e0 and e′n−2.
V ′i−1
Ci+1
ti+1
t′i+1
ti
V ′i
Ci−1
O
Ci
V ′n−1
V ′n−2
C0
t′n−1 tn−1
Cn−2
t0
t′n−1 tn−1
tn−2
e′n−2
e′n−1
e′0
O
Cn−
Figure 10: Range for Voronoi edge shifting.
As shown in Fig. 10, e′i is extended to intersect OCi
and OCi+1 at ti, ti+1, respectively. From ti, we issue a
ray perpendicular to OCi which intersects OCi+1 at t′i+1.
Then the range τi+1 = [t′i+1, ti+1]. The position witihn
this range can guarantee the new Voronoic polygon vertex
V ′i = e
′
i ∩ e′i+1 is within the Delaunay triangle 4CiOCi+1.
For the last Voronoi edge en−1, we compute the range τn−1
determined by e′n−2, and the range τ0 determined by e
′
0.
Therefore, τn−1 ← τn−1 ∩ τ0. The uniformly and randomly
selected Voronoi edge e′n−1 within the range τn−1 intersects
e′n−2 and e
′
0 and produces V
′
n−2 and V
′
n−1, respectively. Then
the resulted shifted Voronoi cell is P′v = 〈V ′0V ′1 . . . V ′n−1〉.
8For the case of n = 3 or 4, the Voronoi polygon is a
triangle or rectangle, then the anonymity zone is itself. They
give very strong and interesting results, where the attacker can
do nothing for predicting the user location. In addition, the
probability to generate a regular shifted Voronoi polygon with
n random numbers is very low and almost won’t happen. We
never met this situation in our large amounts of experiments. In
order to make it for sure, one may add a regularity test to avoid
this case. Figure 4 shows the simulation results, which include
three layers of polygons, Pc, P′v and A
′
z. Figure 11 gives
the histograms of the distances from the shifted Voronoi edge
to the user location O by generating 200 5-sided polygons,
to show the irregularity generated by Voronoi edge (interior)
shifting. Note that in the original convex regular polygon Pc
with sector radius 1.0, the distance of Voronoi edge to the
center O is identical to be 0.5.
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Figure 11: Distances of Voronoi edge shifted from O.
C. Model II - Exterior Shifting
Model II introduces irregularity to the exterior Delaunay
polygon by shifting the regular Delaunay polygon vertices
along their corresponding sector rays within a shifting feasible
range, so that the resulted Voronoi polygon is irregular.
Algorithm 2 gives the computation pipeline. We first gener-
ate an irregular Delaunay polygon around the user location,
then compute the Voronoi polygon, and finally scale the
Voronoi polygon and submit the result to LBS provides.
We first select one point in the neighborhood of the user
location O as the vertex C ′0. We generate the vertices C
′
i one
by one. Here, we set the sector angles to be equal, αi = α =
2pi
n . The range for C
′
i+1 is determined by C
′
i to guarantee the
Voronoi vertex V ′i is within the triangle4C ′iOC ′i+1. Similarly,
the last vertex C ′n−1 is determined by both C
′
0 and C
′
n−2.
Ci
Ci+1
αi
Vi
N
X
Y
M
O
Figure 12: Range for Delaunay polygon vertex selection.
As shown in Fig. 12, by VDD, we have |OM | = 12 |OC ′i|,
|ON | = 12 |OC ′i+1|, |XM | ⊥ |OC ′i|, and |Y N | ⊥ |OC ′i+1|.
In addition, |OM | = |OX| cosαi, and |ON | = |OY | cosαi.
Algorithm 2 Model II - Exterior Shifting
Input: User location O, vertex number n, radius of interest r
Output: The concealing space P∗v
Select a point C0 around O to form the 0-th sector ray
set sector angles αi = 2pi/n
for i← 1 to n− 1 do
Compute the feasible shifting range τi for Ci
C′i ← Rand(τi)
end for
Construct the irregular n-sided polygon P′c = 〈C′0C′1 . . . C′n−1〉
Construct the triangulation T by connecting each Ci’ to O
Compute the Voronoi cell P′v = 〈V ′0V ′1 . . . V ′n−1〉 of T
Compute the closest distance to the edges e′i and compute the
scaling by scalar λ = r
d0
Return P∗v ← λP′v
In order to keep the intersection of |OC ′i| and |OC ′i+1| in the
sector ^C ′i+1OC ′i, the following conditions must hold:
1) |ON | < |OX|: then |ON | < |OM |cosαi ⇒ |ON | <
|OCi|
2cosαi
⇒ |OCi+1|2 < |OCi|2 cosαi ⇒ |OCi+1| <
|OCi|
cosαi
.
2) |OM | < |OY |: then |OC ′i+1| > |OC ′i cosαi|, similarly.
So, we have the inequality
|OC ′i| cosαi < |OC ′i+1| <
|OC ′i|
cosαi
. (4)
For n ≥ 5, αi < pi/2. For n = 3, 4, the angle is close to
or greater than pi/2, then the upper bound will be very large
or no intersection. So we give a parameter µ to constrain the
range. Therefore, we have
|OC ′i| cosαi < |OC ′i+1| < min(µ|OC ′i|,
|OC ′i|
cosαi
). (5)
For the last vertex C ′n1 , we take the intersection of the ranges
based on C ′0, C
′
n−2 using the similar strategy. Then the resulted
irregular Delaunay polygon is P′c = 〈C ′0C ′1 . . . C ′n−1〉. Simi-
larly, for n = 3, 4, P′c is a triangle or rectangle (see Fig. 1),
and A′z is P
′
c itself. Figure 5 shows more simulation results,
which include three layers of polygons, P′c, P
′
v and A
′
z.
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Figure 13: Sector shifting examples for n = 4.
D. Model III - Double Shifting
Model III introduces the irregularity to both the exterior
Delaunay polygon and interior Voronoi polygon. We first shift
the exterior polygon to P′c using Algorithm 1, then compute
the VDD on P′c to get the irregular Voronoi polygon P
′
v,
and finally update P′v by shifting using Algorithm 2. Figure
6 shows the simulation results, which include three layers of
polygons, P′c, P
′
v and A
′
z.
9E. Models α, Iα, IIα, IIIα - Sector Shifting
Models Iα, IIα, IIIα introduce another dimension of irregu-
larity by shifting sector rays from the original equal divisions
(α = 2pin ) while generating n sectors. The surrounding angles
are computed as follows:
αi ← (1± )α,∀i = 0, . . . , n− 1, (6)
where a random number  = Rand[0, κ], and we select
κ ∈ {0, 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.1} in our experiments. The
sector shifting (on sector rays) is not conflict with the previous
interior/exterior shifting (on vertices/edges with fixed sector
rays). Once we get the exterior polygon with random sector
sifting, we then perform the algorithms of Models I-III to
generate the result. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the simulation
results, which include three layers of polygons, P′c, P
′
v and
A′z. For n = 4, the interior polygon P
′
c is not a rectangle
because of the unequal sector angles and the perpendicular
lines at vertices with acute corner angle are outside P′c, as
shown in Fig. 13.
F. Analysis
The following guarantees that the obtained anonymity zone
is qualified to protect user location from attacking.
Lemma 1: The seed O is within the anonymity zone.
Proof: Based on the definition of Voronoi-Delaunay duality,
the Voronoi edge ViVi+1 is the perpendicular bisector of
the sector ray OCi+1, and the Voronoi vertices Vi, Vi+1 are
in the two sides of OCi+1, respectively. According to the
construction of the anonymity zone, the seed O is within the
feasible strip Γi, O ∈ Γi, and Az = ∩{Γi}. Thus O ∈ Az.
Proof for the finally generated irregular A′z is similar.
Lemma 2: The probability of any point in anonymity zone
to be the seed O is equally likely.
Proof: According to Lemma 1, given the anonymity zone
Az, the user location O ∈ Az. Using the conclusions in attack
analysis Section II-D for all the models, every point in the
anonymity zone could be the user location. In theory, if the
sampling resolution of the anonymity zone goes to infinity,
then the probability of revealing the exact location of O goes
to zero. In practice, if it is known that there are M points in
Az for attempting, then the probability of identifying the user
is 1M ; if no such preconditions, the probability to reveal O
is infinitely small (zero). With the same sampling resolution,
the greater the area of anonymity zone Area(Az) (the greater
M ), the more difficult to reveal the seed.
Lemma 3: The anonymity zone area decreases with the
increase of n, for the same radius of interest r.
Proof: According to Lemma 1, anonymity zone is the
intersection region of all the lines drawn at Voronoi vertices
and perpendicular to Voronoi edges. So, the number of the
perpendicular lines are 2n. With the increase of n, a convex
polygon tends to be more circular, then the resulted (shifted)
Voronoi edges become shorter, the perpendicular strips be-
come narrower, and therefore, the area of the intersections of
perpendicular strips (anonymity zone) decreases. This can also
be observed in Fig. 19.
600 700 800 900 1000
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x 106
Radius of ROI (r)
Co
nc
ea
lin
g 
Co
st
 Ψ
 
 
3−VDD I
6−VDD I
9−VDD I
600 700 800 900 1000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
x 106
Radius of ROI (r)
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Le
ve
l Γ
 
 
3−VDD I
6−VDD I
9−VDD I
Figure 14: Concealing cost Ψ and privacy level Γ of VDD
models in terms of different n and r.
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Figure 15: Concealing cost Ψ and privacy level Γ of VDD
models in terms of different n (r = 1.0, κ = 0.1).
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the proposed n-VDD models
in terms of the main principles: privacy level Γ, concealing
cost Ψ, and communication cost Ω. We demonstrate the
efficiency and efficacy of the n-VDD models by experimental
simulations and comparison.
A. Experimental Setup
We first consider a network region, with a square area of
104m × 104m. The location of the user is randomly picked
within this region. The user’s region of interests (ROI) with a
radius will always be within this network region. The different
parameters used to evaluate the performance of the proposed
methods include the number of vertices n, the range for
random angle shifting κ, and the expected neighborhood radius
around the user or of the region of interest r (meter). We
apply this parameter setting to test all the models. For each
combination of these parameters, we perform 1000 iterations
of the algorithm and then compute the average value of
concealing cost and privacy level to generate the statistics.
B. Concealing Cost, Privacy Level
We define the concealing cost Ψ as the measurement of the
area of the concealing space, i.e., the scaled Voronoi polygon
Pv
∗, for all the models. We then define the privacy level Γ as
the measurement of the area of the anonymity zone, i.e., the
scaled most interior polygon Az∗.
1) Impact of Radius of ROI: In theory, with the increase
of the radius r of ROI, the concealing cost Ψ and the privacy
level Γ will linearly increase. This can be easily explained
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Figure 16: Concealing cost Ψ and privacy level Γ of VDD
models in terms of different angle randomness range κ (r =
1.0, n = 7).
in our method as follows: in our settings, we set the initial
radius as r0 = 1.0. Then after generating the shifted Voronoi
polygon Pv′, we adapt it to get the concealing space by a
linear scaling with scalar λ (linear to the customized r) to
cover the ROI. Therefore, we have the linear theoretic claim.
As shown in Fig. 14, an almost similar upward linear trend
of Ψ and Γ appears for different n over r (Model I). Other
n-VDD models have similar results.
2) Impact of Number of Vertices n: We analyze the con-
cealing cost Ψ and the privacy level Γ with different n for
all the models. As shown in Fig. 15, Ψ decreases when n
changes from 3 to 5, but increases when n increases above 5,
while Γ decreases with the increase of n from 3 (Model I).
The plots for other models are similar in our simulations. This
is consistent to Lemma 3.
3) Impact of Angle Randomness Range κ: We analyze the
concealing cost Ψ and the privacy level Γ with different range
of angle randomness κ for all the models. As shown in Fig.
16, the values are almost linear for different κ.
C. Communication Cost
We compute the communication cost Ω as the sum of
upstream and downstream cost in the network traffic.
1) Upstream Traffic: For the n-sided concealing polygon
Pv
∗, the upstream traffic is computed as 48 + 8× n, where a
packet header costs 40 bytes, 8 bytes are added for the user ID
uid, and then 8 bytes are used to represent the x, y coordinates
of each Vi∗.
2) Downstream Traffic: For the N number of preferences
of interest (POIs) returned, the downstream traffic is computed
as 40+8×N , where a packet header costs 40 bytes, and each
POI x, y coordinates costs 8 bytes.
D. Comparison
In this work, we compare our method with the closely
related method, the n-CD model [24], which uses n concealing
disks to cover the user location and the region of interest,
reporting the rotated disk centers and radii of the LBS server.
The intersection region of all these concealing disks defines the
anonymity zone, as shown in Fig. 18. In terms of computation,
the proposed n-VDD models are easy to implement and
practical; the computations are mainly based on line-line in-
tersections, and therefore the anonymizing algorithm is linear.
In contrast, the n-CD model requires circle-circle intersections
which is computationally more expensive. Thus, our method
is more efficient than the n-CD one. The following details
the comparison of the anonymizing performance in terms of
concealing cost, privacy level, and communication cost (see
the plots in Fig. 19 for different n with r = 103, κ = 0.02).
1) Concealing Cost, Privacy Level: Figure 19(a-b) shows
the plots for the n-VDD models I-III, in which, for n = 3, 4,
the concealing space and the anonymity zone overlap. We
observe that in the n-VDD models, the concealing cost has
a peak at n = 5 and decreases from n = 5, and the privacy
level decreases as the value of n increases; in the n-CD model,
they are almost linear (almost identical). While the number of
vertices n is small (n = 3, 4) and big (n ≥ 8), the concealing
cost of the n-VDD models are much lower than n-CD when
the radius of ROI r (103) is fixed. We can simply get that one
can achieve higher privacy level with lower concealing cost
using the models of n-VDD than n-CD with smaller value of
n. Minimizing the trade-off between Ψ and Γ is the primary
goal of an anonymizing protocol. We analyze and compare
this trade-off as the ratio of the two terms Ψ, Γ for the n-CD
and the n-VDD. Figure 19(c) shows that for smaller value of
n (≤ 5), this ratio in the models of n-VDD is much smaller
than n-CD, i.e., we can have higher privacy level compared
to concealing cost for smaller value of n ≤ 5 than n-CD. At
n = 3, 4, the ratio in n-VDD is 1.0 because the concealing
space and the anonymity zone overlap, while n-CD is much
higher. At n = 6, the two models have close values. Therefore,
we can select n ≤ 6 in practice. This trade-off shows the
strength of our proposed methods in case of smaller values of
n. In the other hand, there is flexibility to adapt the values
(performance) by changing n in our models, while the values
for the n-CD model are almost stable with different n.
2) Communication Cost: In the n-CD model, the upstream
traffic cost is calculated as 48 + 12× n, where n denotes the
number of concealing disks, 48 is the sum of 40 bytes for the
packet header and 8 bytes for the user id, 12 is the sum of
8 bytes for disk center x, y coordinates and 4 bytes for disk
radius; the downstream traffic cost is calculated as 40+8×N ,
where N denotes the number of the returned POIs and each
has 8 bytes for x, y coordinates. In terms of upstream cost,
we observe that the n-VDD models are better than n-CD. The
downstream cost largely depends on the area of the concealing
space: the larger the concealing cost, the more the downstream
cost. Moreover, if the concealing cost is high, the quality of
services will be low. So we can define both downstream cost
and quality of services as functions of concealing cost. From
Fig. 19(c), we see that the concealing cost of the n-VDD
models are lower than that of n-CD, implying the maximum
bound of both the communication cost and quality of services
error are lower.
V. CONCLUSION
We present a novel location privacy framework, the so-
called n-VDD, based on the Voronoi-Delaunay duality (VDD).
This work is based on the insight that only an irregular Voronoi
cell around the user location can not induce the user location
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Figure 17: Simulation examples of the n-CD model [24] for comparison (r = 1.0).
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Figure 18: Simulation examples of the n-VDD model I after scaling (r = 1.0).
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Figure 19: Comparison between the n-VDD models and n-CD model in terms of n (r = 103).
(or the seed) but can give the anonymity zone, which is
the intersection of all the parallel strips perpendicular to and
bounded by Voronoi edges. We introduce the irregularity to the
Voronoi cell using three terms for random shifting and their
combinations: (1) interior shifting - starting from a regular
polygon and shifting the generated Voronoi cell to be irregular
with randomness, (2) exterior shifting - starting from an irregu-
lar polygon generated with randomness, and (3) sector shifting
- starting from a regular polygon and shifting the sector rays
around the seed. All the computations are efficient based on
basic planar geometry and linear algebra. Experiments and
comparisons have demonstrated the efficiency and efficacy
for protecting the user location. In future work, we will
explore the location privacy applications in 3D environment
by generalizing planar n-VDD to volumetric n-VDD.
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